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Practicalities And Peculiarities: The Heightened Due
Process Standard For Notice Under Jones v. Flower
By Emily Riley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine receiving a phone call from a relative and learning that,
while you were busy or out of town or ill, the government sold your
house, a house you had owned for many years, without your
knowledge. Or perhaps you return to your out-of-state vacation
home which you frequent every July, only to find that it has been
condemned. If a property owner never receives notice that the State
plans to sell his property due to tax delinquency, have the due
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment been satisfied?
The Supreme Court in Jones v. Flower considered the question of
whether, when notice of a tax sale is returned undelivered, the
government must take additional steps to provide notice before
taking the property.
Jones v. Flowers is an important case because it attempts to clear
some of the doctrinal fog surrounding the due process analysis in tax
forfeiture cases. In fact, "[t]he lack of clarity about the constitutional
requirements applicable to property tax foreclosure procedures
profoundly affects the social and financial stability of a local
government."' Inefficient notice procedures may result in tax
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delinquency and property abandonment, and the financial impact of a
rising delinquency rate can dramatically impair a local government.2
This note explores the Supreme Court's ruling in Jones v.
Flowers. Part II delves into the historical background, including the
legal and statutory background, leading up to Jones v. Flowers. Part
III of this note will provide an overview of the facts of Jones v.
Flowers. Part IV provides analysis of both the majority and the
dissenting opinions. Part V discusses the judicial, legislative and
administrative impacts of this case, and Part VI concludes the
discussion of Jones v. Flowers.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 3 Since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the legal standards defining what process is due and what action
constitutes a proper means of providing due process have been ever-
changing.
At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court decided Longyear
v. Toolan, Ballard v. Hunter, Leigh v. Green, and Winona & St. Peter
Land Co. v. Minnesota, which all found notice by publication alone
to be adequate in actions enforcing the payment of delinquent
property taxes.4
Those cases employed three separate rationales to reach the
conclusion that notice by publication was sufficient. First, the Court
provided the rationale that "an in rem proceeding, which creates no
personal liability, requires less notice to owners in order to meet the
fairness standard of due process."5 Second, the Court justified the
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
4. See Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 418 (1907); Ballard v. Hunter, 204
U.S. 241, 261-62 (1906); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 93 (1904); Winona & St.
Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526, 537-38 (1895).
5. Alexander, supra note 1 at 765. See Leigh, 193 U.S. at 90, 92. But it is to
be remembered that the primary object of the [in rem] statute is to reach the land
which has been assessed .... "Looked at either from the point of view of history or
holding that notice by publication was sufficient on the basis of the
"caretaker" principle, that a property owner is responsible to know
about and meet any obligations arising as a result of property
ownership. 6 Third, the Court justified notice by publication because
of the fact that "[t]he imposition of ad valorem taxes and assessments
does not require personal service to the property owner, and so long
as some opportunity is given for the owner to contest the accuracy of
the tax, no further obligation exists upon enforcement of procedures
for nonpayment of the tax."7
Thus, up to this point in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, mere
notice by publication was the only measure required by the Court to
satisfy the Due Process Clause. However, soon the Supreme Court
began moving towards more stringent requirements in order for
of the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem, dealing with a
tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service
upon claimants within the state, or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution." Id. at 90-92 (quoting Justice
Holmes, then Chief Justice of Massachusetts, in Tyler v. Judges of the Court of
Registration, 55 N.E. 812, 813 (Mass. 1900)). A proceeding to enforce a lien for
delinquent ad valorem taxes usually is a classic in rem proceeding, affecting all
other interests in the property, precisely because the tax lien is accorded a "super-
priority" status.
6. Id. See Longyear, 209 U.S. at 418 ("[t]he owner of property whose taxes,
duly assessed, have remained unpaid for more than one year must be held to the
knowledge that proceedings for sale are liable to be begun . . ... "); Ballard, 204
U.S. at 254 ("[t]he land stands accountable to the demands of the state, and the
owners are charged with the laws affecting it and the manner by which those
demands may be enforced.").
7. Id. See Leigh, 193 U.S. at 89 (.'[t]he process of taxation does not require
the same kind of notice as is required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for
taking private property under the power of eminent domain."' (quoting Bell's Gap
R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890))); Winona, 159 U.S. at 537-38
(holding that there is no due process violation "if the owner has an opportunity to
question the validity or the amount of [the tax] either before that amount is
determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection"). In 1935, the National
Municipal League adopted "A Model Real Property Tax Collection Law," which
provided for a two step process of notification involving the sale of the property in
a nonjudicial proceeding, followed by a period of redemption prescribed by statute.
Alexander, supra note lat 766.
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notification to comply with due process. 8  The 1950 decision of
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. embodied that shift.9
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. is the central
decision around which discussions of notice requirements imposed
by the Due Process Clause revolve. The issue in Mullane was
whether beneficiaries of a common trust fund established in New
York were provided constitutionally sufficient notice of actions
affecting their interests in the trust. 10 The New York Banking Law
authorized a trust company to establish a common fund and invest
the assets of an unlimited number of estates, trusts, or other funds."l
In 1946, a common trust fund was established by the Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Company under the New York Banking
Law.12 Then, in 1947, the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company
sought settlement of its first account for which it had served as
common trustee. 13  The gross capital of the trust fund was almost
three million dollars, with 113 trusts, approximately half of which
were inter vivos and half of which were testamentary trusts. 14 During
the proceedings, it became clear that at least some of the numerous
beneficiaries did not live in New York, and Central Hanover Bank
and Trust needed to notify those beneficiaries. 1 5
The Bank attempted to provide notice of the application to settle
the trust by publishing the notice in a local newspaper, an action
8. Id.
9. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307 (1950).
10. Id. at 307.
11. Id. at 309-310. The trust functioned as follows: "[e]ach participating trust
shares ratably in the common fund, but exclusive management and control is in the
trust company as trustee, and neither a fiduciary nor any beneficiary of a
participating trust is deemed to have ownership in any particular asset or
investment of this common fund. The trust company must keep fund assets
separate from its own, and in its fiduciary capacity may not deal with itself or any
affiliate. Provisions are made for accountings twelve to fifteen months after the
establishment of a fund and triennially thereafter. The decree in each such judicial
settlement of accounts is made binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth in
the account upon everyone having any interest in the common fund or in any
participating estate, trust or fund." Id. at 309.




which satisfied the minimum notice requirements set forth in the
New York Banking Law.' 6 The extent of the notice required by the
New York Banking Law was notice by newspaper publication giving
the name and address of the Central Hanover Bank and Trust, "the
name and the date of establishment of the common trust fund, and a
list of all participating estates, trusts or funds."' 17 In an effort to
provide notice to the beneficiaries of the trust and comply with New
York Banking Law § 100-c (12), Central Hanover Bank and Trust
published notice of its actions in a local newspaper.
18
Mullane challenged the sufficiency of the notice given by Central
Hanover Bank and Trust, and the Supreme Court held that the
government is required to provide "notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections." 19 Thus, the Court found the New York statute
requiring lesser forms of notice to be incompatible with the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 °
Mullane served to eschew the prior due process interpretations
which drew distinctions between the type of notice required where
the state possessed in personam jurisdiction versus in rem
jurisdiction, and held that notice by publication alone is insufficient
where the state possesses information regarding the identities and
16. Id. at 309-10. The applicable statute was N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c(12),
which stated that
[a]fter filing such petition [for judicial settlement of its account]
the petitioner shall cause to be issued by the court in which the
petition is filed an shall publish not less than once in each week
for four successive weeks in a newspaper to be designated by the
court a notice or citation addressed generally without naming
them to all parties interested in such common trust fund and in
such estates, trusts or funds mentioned in the petition, all of
which may be described in the notice or citation only in the
manner set forth in said petition and without setting forth the
residence of any such decedent or donor of any such estate, trust
or fund.
17. Id. at 310.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 314.
20. Id. at 320.
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contact information of the interested parties. 21 With regard to this
principle, the Court stated that "[c]hance alone brings to the attention
of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the
back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area
of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the information
will never reach him are large indeed., 22
The effect of Mullane was to undermine and invalidate prior tax
foreclosure procedures existing in many states and create a flexible
standard of reasonableness dependent on the circumstances and
variables particular to a certain case. 23
However, while Mullane did provide some guidance as to what
process is due, it also left some questions open for further inquiry and
interpretation. For instance, while the Court in Mullane invalidated
one of the bases for earlier decisions on this issue, the distinction
between notice provided where jurisdiction was in personam versus
in rem, the Court did not invalidate either the "caretaker" proposition
or the idea that tax policies are unique in nature and allow for the
distinct treatment of property tax foreclosure procedures. 24  Also,
Mullane did not answer the question of whether tax officials were
required to delve into public records or conduct title examinations in
order to ascertain an interested party's address in order to provide
notice.2
5
Six years after Mullane, the Supreme Court decided Covey v.
Town of Somers, which established that a state must take known
circumstances into account when providing notice. 26 In Covey, a
property owner challenged a New York statute which required notice
by publication, by posting, and by mailing for publication of tax liens
on real property. 27 The statute applied to all property-related actions
in the state regardless of the infancy, incompetancy, or absence of the
21. Id. at 315; Alexander, supra note 1 at 766.
22. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
23. Alexander, supra note 1 at 767.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1956).
27. Id. at 142.
party in interest and regardless of whether the party in interest was
domiciled in another state.
28
Pursuant to the statute, the town of Somers instituted a procedure
to foreclose a tax lien against property owned by an incompetent.2 9
In accordance with the statute, notice was served by mail, by posting
notice at the post office, and by publication in two local
newspapers. 30 When no one responded to the notices, the Town of
Somers foreclosed on the woman's home, and a deed to the property
was granted to the Town.3 ' Five days after the deed was issued to the
town, the property owner was certified by the county court to be a
person of unsound mind and was committed to a mental hospital the
following week.32  Subsequently, the appellant filed bond as
committee of the person and property of the incompetent.33 Around
the time of the sale of the property, the appellant's attorney came
before the town board and offered to pay the taxes on the property in
exchange for title to the estate, but the offer was refused.34
The court below developed a factual record establishing the
property owner as a long-time resident of the town of Somers, who
owned several properties and possessed the means to meet her
financial obligations at all times. 35 Unfortunately, she lived alone
with no relatives nearby and no one to assist her with her taxes,
despite the fact that she had been an incompetent for over fifteen
years. 36 Further, the lower court established that the citizens and the
officials of the town of Somers had known of her inability to
maintain her finances or understand the significance of notice served
upon her, but no one sought appointment of a committee for her
person or property until after her property had already been
foreclosed.37
28. Id. at 143.
29. Id. at 144.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 144.
34. Id. at 144-45.
35. Id. at 145.
36. Id. at 146.
37. Id.
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The Supreme Court held that notice of foreclosure to a woman
who was known to be incompetent violated the Due Process
Clause. 38 Following the Mullane standards, the Court stated:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections . . . . When notice is a
person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not
due process. The means employed must be such as
one desirous of actually informing the absentee might
reasonably adopt to accomplish it.39
Because the property owner was incompetent, and because the
town of Somers knew her to be so, the notice by mail, posting and
publication did not satisfy the Due Process Clause.4 °  Without
specifically stating it, the Covey decision seems to imply that, where
the state is attempting to notify a known incompetent of a tax
foreclosure, the only means of satisfying due process and providing
more than "a mere gesture" would be to serve notice on someone
acting as a representative or guardian of the incompetent's interests or
seek appointment of a committee for the property of the incompetent.
Thus, the inquiry is not whether the notice actually reaches the
interested party, but whether notice was reasonably calculated to
inform the interested party.
Only a few months after deciding Covey in May of 1956, the
Supreme Court decided Walker v. Hutchinson.41 In Walker, the city
of Hutchinson filed an action to condemn part of Lee Walker's
property so as to widen a city street.42 A Kansas statute provided that
notice could take the form of written notice or notice by publication
38. Id. at 147.
39. Id. at 146 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 147.
41. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
42. Id. at 112-13.
in the city paper. 43 Walker was not notified in writing of the action
against his property, and the City only provided notice in the form of
publication in the official newspaper of the City.44 When Walker did
not respond to the notice, the City allotted him damages in the
amount of $725, and since Walker failed to appeal within the state's
statutory period, he filed an action with the District Court.45 Walker
claimed that he received no notice and knew nothing of the
condemnation proceedings until after the time for appeal had
passed.46 Walker sought injunctive and equitable relief from the
City's action on his property.47
The issue before the Court was whether notice by newspaper
publication satisfied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment under the circumstances in this case. 48  The Court
referred to the standard developed in Mullane for constitutionally
adequate notice and stated, "[w]e there called attention to the
impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of notice that
must be given; notice required will vary with circumstances and
conditions."49 The Court held that notice by publication alone was
not sufficient to satisfy due process in this case because of the
"infirmities" of newspaper publication discussed in Mullane and the
fact that nothing prevented the city from giving a more direct form of
notice. 50  The city knew Walker's name, and the official records
contained his personal information. 51 The Court stated that, under
the circumstances, a letter would have been a superior form of
notice.52
In sum, the Walker Court equated notice by publication to no
notice at all.53 This case served to cast serious doubt upon the use of
publication as an accepted form of notice under the Due Process
43. Id. at 113.
44. Id. at 113-14.
45. Id. at 114.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 115.
49. Id. at 115.
50. Id. at 116.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 117.
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Clause. While not expressly rejecting notice by publication, the
Court considered the State's reliance on Huling v. Kaw Valley
Railway & Improvement Co., an 1889 case upholding notice by
publication on the ground that the landowner was a non-resident of
the state, to be "misplaced. 54 The Court did not squarely reach the
issue, but stated that, "[s]ince appellant in this case is a resident of
Kansas, we are not called upon to consider the extent to which
Mullane may have undermined the reasoning of the Huling
decision." 55 This statement further solidified the understanding that
Mullane did, in fact, undermine the reasoning of the Huling decision,
and that notice by publication alone is constitutionally inadequate.
Similar to Walker, the 1962 case of Schroeder v. New York
addressed the constitutional validity of notice via publication.56 In
Scroeder, the issue to be considered by the Court was whether New
York deprived the appellant of due process by failing to provide
adequate notice of condemnation proceedings against her Orange
County, New York property.5 7 The property included one and one-
half acres of land and a house. The appellant only occupied the
property for two months out of each year.58
The appellant's land was condemned pursuant to the New York
City Water Supply Act. The Act required notice consisting of
publications in two public New York City newspapers and
publication in two public newspapers in the county in which the real
estate was located.59  The city complied with those notice
requirements, and went beyond the statute by posting twenty-two
notices along a seven or eight mile portion of the river in the area
surrounding the appellant's property during the month of January
when the property sat vacant and no notice was posted on the
property itself.60 The two Orange County newspapers were not
published in the community in which appellant's property was
located and were, in fact, published in communities "many miles"
54. Id. at 116.
55. Id.
56. Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
57. Id. at 208.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 209.
60. Id. at 210.
from the property in question.6" Further, neither the posted notices
nor the published notices contained the name of the appellant,
information on what action could be taken to recover damages caused
by the condemnation of the property, or any information regarding
the length of time an affected property owner had to file a claim.62
The appellant failed to file within the three year period prescribed
by statute, but later brought an equitable action, claiming that she had
never received notice of the condemnation and knew nothing of the
condemnation until she consulted a lawyer approximately seven
years after the condemnation proceedings had begun.63  Thus, the
appellant claimed she had been deprived of property without being
afforded due process. 64
The Schroeder Court held that notice by publication and posting
did not satisfy the standard of notice required under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under the circumstances of this
case.65 Quoting Mullane, the Court stated:
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local
resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the
back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home
outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation
the odds that the information will never reach him are
large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further
reduced when, as here, the notice required does not
even name those whose attention it is supposed to
attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might
call it to attention.6
6
Thus, the Schroeder Court affirmed the general rule of Mullane
that notice by publication is insufficient to satisfy due process
requirements when an interested party's name and address are known
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 210-11.
64. Id. at 211.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 212 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
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or easily ascertainable. 67 For application of the rule, the Schroeder
Court considered the similar factual scenario presented in the Walker
case and stated that the posted notice was neither posted on the
appellant's property nor seen by her, so the postings did not
constitute personal notice in compliance with Mullane.68 Further, the
Court stated that the city was constitutionally obligated to attempt in
good faith to provide notice to the appellant, and the simple mailing
of a notice letter would have satisfied that obligation. 69 Thus, the
Court found the notice in this case to be constitutionally deficient.7 °
In 1982, Greene v. Lindsey also dealt with the issue of the extent
of notice required to satisfy due process. 71 In Greene a Kentucky
statute allowed notice in forcible entry or detainer actions to be
posted on the door of the residence or apartment.72 The question
before the Supreme Court was whether the Kentucky statute, when
invoked in an action against tenants in a public housing project,
provided constitutionally adequate notice of the actions against them
as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.73
The appellees in Greene consisted of several tenants of a housing
project in Louisville, Kentucky, whose apartments were subject to
detainer actions initiated by the Housing Authority of Louisville for
repossession of their apartments.74
Pursuant to statute, the sheriff posted notice of the actions on the
door of each apartment, but the appellees claimed never to have seen
the posted writs of forcible entry and detainer. They also claimed
never to have learned of the eviction proceedings until they had been
served with writs of possession and after their opportunity for appeal
had lapsed.75 The appellees sought declaratory and injunctive relief
in the United States District Court, claiming that the posted notice did
67. Id. at 212-13.
68. Id. at 213.
69. Id. at 214.
70. Id.
71. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
72. Id. at 445.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 446.
75. Id. at 446-47.
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not satisfy the constitutional standard for adequate notice set forth in
Mullane.7
6
The Court began its analysis by stating that due process requires
an opportunity to be heard, and the "right to be heard has little reality
or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can
choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or
contest. '77 The Greene Court then referred to the Mullane test as the
constitutional minimum: "An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 78
The Greene Court went on to reject the claim that there is a
difference in notice due for in rem actions versus in personam
actions. 79 The appellees were deprived of a property interests in their
home, and "[i]n light of this deprivation, it will not suffice to recite
that because the action is in rem, it is only necessary to serve notice
'upon the thing itself."' 80 The test for determining the sufficiency of
notice is whether the notice will inform people of the proceedings
against them.
8 1
However, the Greene Court went on to affirm the "caretaker"
principle, saying that it is reasonable to rely on a property owner
maintaining watch over his or her property, and that significant legal
consequences may befall a property owner who does not keep watch
over his or her property. 82  So long as that principle provided
guidance for state action, a state could safely assume that "the secure
posting of a notice on the property of a person is likely to offer that
property owner sufficient warning of the pendency of proceedings
possibly affecting his interests." 83 The Court further stated that a
tenant having a continuing interest in occupying a certain property
76. Id. at 447.
77. Id. at 449 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
78. Id. at 449-50 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
79. Id. at 450.
80. Id. at 451.
81. Id.
82. Id at 451-52.
83. Id. at 452.
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would likely be present and receive the notice, and a tenant who does
not receive notice because he or she no longer inhabits the premises
would suffer a lesser injury for not receiving the posted notice. 84
In fact, the Greene Court goes so far as to say that, aside from
providing personal service, notice posted on a person's residence
would constitute "not only a constitutionally acceptable means of
service, but indeed a singularly appropriate and effective way of
ensuring that a person who cannot conveniently be served personally
is actually apprised of proceedings against him."85  However, the
Court eventually determined posted notice to be constitutionally
insufficient in this case and under these particular circumstances. 86
The Court rejected the contention that posted notice is a last
resort since the applicable statute failed to provide for a second
attempt at personal service which could be carried out at a time when
the tenant would be more likely to be on the premises.8 7 Further, the
fact that a tenant is not present after one attempt at personal service
in no way indicates that a tenant is less invested in the property or has
abandoned the property.88 The Greene Court then cited notice by
mail as a possible remedy for a notification process lacking in
constitutional protections. 89 Thus, because of the existence of other
reliable means of notification, the state's action in Greene did not
constitute notice reasonably calculated to inform the parties of the
action against them.90
While the Green Court struck down the use of posted notice
based on the facts of the case, it explicitly sanctioned the use of
posted notice in other circumstances. 91 Thus, after Green the key
84. Id.
85. Id. at 453.
86. Id. The Court noted that notice posted in apartment complexes are often
removed by children or other tenants, never to be received by the party in interest.
A deposition of the process servers revealed that the process server had seen
children taking down the writs on more than one occasion. Id. at 453 n.7.
87. Id. at 454.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 455.
90. Id.
91. Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Postman Never Rings Twice: The
Constitutionality of Service of Process by Posting After Greene v. Lindsay, 33
A.M. U.L. REV. 601, 603 (1984); Greene, 456 U.S at 452-53.
issue became the circumstances in which posted notice was proper or
improper.92 Also, the Greene decision marked a movement away
from the "caretaker" doctrine, which espoused a more duty-oriented
view of notice and made it the duty of the person in possession of an
interest in property to now be aware of the law and the affect it would
have on the property, in favor of a more normative view that notice
must be reasonably likely to inform in order to be constitutional.93
In 1983, the Supreme Court held in Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams that "a mortgagee's knowledge of delinquency in
the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is
pending."94 Thus, it cannot be said that a state is exempted from
providing notice to the extent required by the Fourteenth Amendment
simply because the property owner could have taken steps to prevent
the sale of his or her property. 95
In Mennonite, the issue before the Court was whether notice in
the form of publication and posting sufficiently notified a mortgagee
of a tax sale of the mortgagee's property for failure to pay taxes.96
Alfred Moore had executed a mortgage in favor of the Mennonite
Board of Missions (MBM) on property Moore had purchased from
MBM as security for an obligation in the amount of $14,000. 97
Under the agreement, Moore was responsible for paying the property
taxes, but unbeknownst to MBM, Moore had failed to do so.98
Indiana law required notice to be posted at the county courthouse,
published once per week for three consecutive weeks and sent via
certified mail to the interested party's last known address. 99
However, until 1980, Indiana law did not provide for notice to
mortgagees of property either by mail or personal service.100 As
such, the County provided notice as required by statute, but MBM
was not notified by County or by Moore of the impending sale of the
92. Greenbaum, supra note 91at 603.
93. Id. at 617.
94. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983).
95. Id. at 799 (holding that a party's ability to take steps to safeguard its
interests does not relieve the state of its constitutional obligation).
96. Id. at 792.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 793.
100. Id.
Spring 2007 Practicalities and Peculiarities
224 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-1
property, and the property was subsequently sold.' 10 MBM did not
learn of the tax sale until after the redemption period had expired,
and Moore still owed $8,237.19 under the previous agreement. 10 2
The Mennonite Court stated that ". . . a mortgagee possesses a
substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax
sale," and as such, is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to
apprise the mortgagee of a pending tax sale.'0 3 Thus, when the
interest of a mortgagee is public record, notice by publication no
longer suffices, and notice must be either sent by mail to the
mortgagee's last known address or conveyed by personal service. 10 4
Notice by publication no longer suffices where the mortgagee is
"reasonably identifiable."' 0 5
The Mennonite case came after centuries of the Supreme Court's
deference to the autonomy of the states in the field of property tax
collection, and "this decision of the United States Supreme Court cast
into doubt the majority of property tax lien and tax sale procedures
used throughout the United States."' 1 6 Also, while the holding on the
particular facts in Mennonite seemed clear, the holding has proven
challenging in application and has given birth to varying
interpretations. 10 7 This is because, "[r]eluctant to create bright lines
of universally applicable rights and duties, the Court concluded that a
party holding a 'legally protected property interest' whose name and
address are 'reasonably ascertainable' based upon 'reasonably
diligent efforts' is entitled to notice 'reasonably calculated' to inform
[the property owner] of the proceeding."' 10 8
This opinion left open questions of when adequate notice is
required, when notice by publication is insufficient, how the state
determines the interested parties, and how far the state must go in
order to secure the adequate contact information of interested
101. Id. at 794.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 798.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Alexander, supra note 1 at 749.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798, 800).
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parties.' 09 Because of the different interpretations of these questions,
".... there is virtually no consensus among the state and local taxing
jurisdictions on the application of the constitutional requirements to
these four subsidiary questions, with many courts and commentators
blending inappropriately the analysis of two or more questions." ' 0
This lack of clarity caused the procedures for notice in tax lien
situations in many states to be subject to constitutional challenge, and
it also led to inefficient collection of taxes, inconsistencies in the tax
lien notice regulations, and an inability on the part of local
governments and property owners to predict the result of an action to
compel the fulfillment of tax obligations."'
Also, the Mennonite decision required that constitutionally
adequate notice be afforded to parties possessing a "legally protected
property interest."'"12  The courts have been inconsistent in their
determinations of who is entitled to notice, with mortgage interests
being considered a legally protected interest in property and
constitutional doubt being cast on a procedure where lessees,
occupants of property, purchasers under land sale contracts, or the
holders of easements or covenants do not receive constitutionally
adequate notice.11 3 Thus, where the mortgage holder or any of those
other parties were not in receipt of constitutionally adequate notice,
tax lien purchasers, tax sale purchasers, and title insurance companies
were at risk."14
Mennonite served to build upon Mullane by clarifying, first, that
the standards of notice required for in personam jurisdiction are the
same as those required for in rem jurisdiction. 15 Second, Mennonite
made it clear that both mortgagees and property owners possess
legally protected property interests and are entitled to the same
degree of notice procedure under the Due Process Clause." 6 Third,
the Mennonite Court clarified that, where names and address are
109. Id. at 749-50.
110. Id. at 750.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. (quoting Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. See also Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 796 n.3.
116. Id.
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included in the property deed records, that information must be used
to provide notice to the interested parties."l 7
The Mennonite decision also rejected the "caretaker" justification
for notice by posting and publication."18  After the Mennonite
decision, efforts to identify parties holding property interests required
an examination of the records of the tax collector, and an
examination of the public records for title information was also most
likely necessary, and the current due process standard required notice
which was "reasonably calculated" to inform parties holding legally
protected property interests where the parties' names and addresses
are "reasonably ascertainable by "reasonably diligent efforts." 9
In the post-Mennonite years, state and local governments have
endeavored to statutorily provide for constitutionally adequate notice
procedures for property tax collections, but many have not
successfully done so.' 2 0 Because of the importance property taxes
play in governmental finance, inefficient, complicated, or
constitutionally unsound collection procedures burden the
governments. 121
Some of the more recent precedent of the Supreme Court states
that due process does not require a State to provide actual notice of a
taking of life, liberty or property in order to comply with due process
considerations, but a state must attempt to provide actual notice. 122
The Supreme Court chose to hear this case in order to resolve a
conflict between the circuit courts and the state supreme courts
regarding whether due process requires the government to take
"additional reasonable steps to notify a property owner when notice
117. Id.
118. Greenbaum, supra note 91 at 618. Although, in later terms, every Justice
but Justice Breyer affirmed or validated the "caretaker" principle, so this was likely
not a complete rejection of the principle that a person is responsible for the goings
on related to his or her own property. Id.
119. Id; Mullane, 462 U.S.at 798. Examination of public record is a
requirement that many jurisdictions prefer not to impose on their enforcement and
collection agencies. Greenbaum, supra note 91 at 618.
120. Mullane, 462 U.S at 769.
121. Id.
122. Dusenberry v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170-72 (2002) (emphasis
added) (due process is satisfied where a state attempts notification via certified
mail, and someone at the prison where the property owner is incarcerated signs for
the notice letter).
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of a tax sale is returned undelivered."' 123 For example, in Akey v.
Clinton County, the Second Circuit held that, where a foreclosure
notice is returned, the County was required to utilize "reasonably
diligent efforts" to ascertain the owner's correct address. 124
Also, in Kennedy v. Mossafa, the New York Court of Appeals
rejected the view that the obligation to provide notice under the Due
Process Clause is satisfied by simply sending notice to the address
listed on the tax roll where the notice is returned as
"undeliverable". 125 However, in Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condo
Ass'n, the Supreme Court of Michigan stated that where notice is
returned as undeliverable, the State is not required to take further
action to see if another address can be located. 126
In terms of application, the Mullane standards for constitutionally
adequate notice have presented difficulties for the lower courts, and
have produced divergent results. 127 For instance, Madewell v. Downs
was a case in which the Eighth Circuit considered the due process
requirements for seized property. 128  Terry Madewell brought an
action against agents of the federal Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and against the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP) based
on alleged violations of his Fifth Amendment right to due process
because of the seizure of currency during Madewell's arrest for
conspiracy to distribute marijuana and methamphetamine, and
violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in the
transfer of the seized currency from the MSHP to the DEA.'29
The currency was seized by the DEA pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
881, and prior to forfeiture, the DEA sent a notice of seizure letter to
Madewell at the address given by Madewell upon his arrest via
certified mail. 130 The notice was returned and marked as "Moved.
Left no address."' 3 1  Subsequently, the DEA published notice in
123. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. at 1713.
124. Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2004).
125. Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N.Y. 2d 1, 9 (2003).
126. Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condo Ass'n, 463 Mich. 420, 429 (2000).
127. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 233
(2006).
128. Madewell v. Downs, 68 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 1995).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1035.
131. Id.
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U.S.A. Today for three consecutive weeks. 13 2  When no one
responded to the published notice, the money was forfeited pursuant
to 21 U.S.C. § 881.133 The named defendants in this action were
various DEA and MSHP agents as well as two Lawrence County
prosecutors. 1
34
Madewell claimed the defendants violated his due process rights
because "the notice of the administrative forfeiture proceedings was
sent to Madewell at the wrong address when his proper address was
known to state and federal agents."' 35  Madewell's specific claims
were that
(a) the Appellee DEA agents knew or should have
known the Appellant's then-current location, (b) the
Appellee DEA agents knew or should have known the
name and address of Appellant's attorney, and (c) the
resulting constructive notice to the Appellant was in
the form of boilerplate in three issues of USA
Today. 136
The Eighth Circuit began by citing Mullane for the principle that
[t]he statutory right to compel an agency to proceed
by judicial condemnation is a vital congressional
restraint on arbitrary confiscations. Yet, as in other
adjudicatory settings, this right has little reality or
worth unless one is informed that the matter is
pending and can choose for himself whether to appear
or default, acquiesce or contest. 1
37
The Eighth Circuit further affirmed the Mullane requirement of
"notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Madewell, 68 F.3d at 1035.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1036. Terry Madewell had been investigated and was eventually
arrested for drug-related crimes in connection with a Missouri drug ring. Id. at
1034. He was originally arrested by the MSHP in possession of drugs and $9,400
in United States currency. Id. The contraband was seized by the MSHP, but was
later "adopted" by the DEA. Id.
137. Id. at 1046 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
opportunity to present their objections."' 38  The Eighth Circuit also
cited Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams for the principle that
failure to deliver statutorily required notice to an address known to be
the actual location of the interested party does not comply with the
due process requirements.' 39
However, because the DEA sent the notice of forfeiture to the
address Madewell had provided after his arrest, because Madewell
was not required by the authorities to be in any other location, and
because the DEA had no notice of Madewell's second address and
contacts between DEA agents and Madewell would not have given
the DEA notice of the other address Madewell was occupying, the
Eighth Circuit stated that:
[A]ny confusion about Madewell's actual residence
was the result of Madewell's own conduct, not the
result of a willful failure to send notice to an address
the DEA knew or should have known. Thus, the
DEA's endeavors to provide Madewell with written
notice by sending such notice to his last known
address was 'reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances,' to achieve the result required by due
process. 140
Further, the Eighth Circuit found the notice by publication to be
proper and adequate since the DEA pursued this course of action as
prescribed by statute upon receiving the returned notice.14,
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit found that Madewell's due process
rights were not offended by the administrative forfeiture and affirmed
138. Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
139. Id. For purposes of analysis, the Eighth Circuit also considered its own
decision in United States v. Woodall, in which a claimant "had alleged that the
notice of forfeiture was sent to his home, but that it was sent during the pendency
of his federal criminal prosecution, the district court had ordered his release to a
different residence known to the government, and no notice was mailed either to
his correct address or to his attorney." United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 794
(8th Cir. 1993). In Woodall, the Eighth Circuit held that "if the facts in this case
are as Woodall alleges - something we cannot determine on this record -- he did
not receive adequate notice of the administrative forfeiture and is entitled to have
the forfeiture Declaration voided." Woodall, 12 F.3d at 795. However, the Eighth
Circuit found this case to be distinguishable. Madewell, 68 F.3d at 1046.
140. Id. at 1047 (quoting Woodall, 12 F.3d at 794-95).
141. Id.
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the decision of the United States District Court granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. 142
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the due process notice
requirements under Mullane in a different manner in Plemons v.
Gale.143  Plemons was a property owner who failed to pay her
property taxes because of a mistaken belief that the bank from which
she acquired financing was paying the property taxes. 144 Because the
property taxes were not paid, the sheriff sold a tax lien on the
property, and the purchaser followed West Virginia law in filing a list
of those who should be served with notice by the county clerk. 145
The list included Plemons, among others, and it also provided three
addresses at which Plemons might be reached. 146  In addition to
sending notice to three of Plemons' properties, the clerk sent notices
to "occupant" at the rental property that was subject to the lien. 147
The notices were sent via certified mail, and all of them were
returned undelivered because Plemons had been renting the
properties and living elsewhere. 148  Upon return of the mailed
notices, the tax lien holder published notice of Plemons' right of
redemption in two local newspapers and also posted notice on the
front door of the County Courthouse. 49 On May 7, 2002, a deed was
issued to the lienholder; on November 22, 2002, the lienholder
conveyed the property to another individual via quitclaim deed; then
in January of 2003, Plemons found out about the tax sale of her
property. 150 Plemons sought to set aside both the original tax deed
and the subsequent deed. 15 1
142. Id. at 1047.
143. Plemons v. Gale, 396 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2005).





149. Plemons, 396 F.3d at 571.
150. Id. Apparently, Plemons had used her properties as rentals and had taken
up residence in a place called Quarry Pointe two or three months before the notices
were mailed out. Id.
151. Id. Under West Virginia law, a person could set aside a tax-sale deed so
long as they can show "by clear and convincing evidence" that the purchaser
"failed to exercise reasonably diligent efforts to provide notice of his intention to
In determining whether constitutionally sufficient notice was
provided to Plemons before her property interest was extinguished,
the Fourth Circuit began its analytical journey with the
aforementioned Mullane requirement of notice that is reasonably
calculated to inform the parties of the action and give them a chance
to respond. 152 The Fourth Circuit considered the Supreme Court's
clarification that "when notice is a person's due, process which is a
mere gesture is not due process."' 153  The Fourth Circuit further
explained that adequate notice must be reasonable and take into
account the unique circumstances of each case.' 54  Also, Mullane
held notice by publication to be sufficient only where the location of
the interested party cannot be ascertained. 155
The Fourth Circuit continued on to say that
[c]ases following Mullane have sharpened its rule, but
reasonable efforts designed to 'actually inform' a
party with a property interest of possible deprivation
of that interest remain the touchstone of
constitutionally adequate notice. Thus, although the
Constitution does not always require actual receipt of
notice, it does always require efforts 'reasonably
acquire such title to the complaining party." Id. at 572 (quoting W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 1 IA-4-4 (b)(West 2006)). The related West Virginia statutes were interpreted by
the lower court to "require a purchaser to exercise due diligence in identifying and
locating parties entitled to notice and to allow publication notice only after the
exercise of such diligence." Id. at 572. Based on its interpretation of Mullane and
Mennonite Bd. of Missions, the lower court found West Virginia's statutory notice
requirements to be valid under the United States Constitution and concluded that
"when notice sent by certified mail is returned unclaimed, the reasonable diligence
standard requires the purchaser to make further inquiry reasonably calculated to
locate the interested party's correct address." Plemons, 396 F.3d at 572. The lower
court further stated that the lienholder had a number of ways in which it could have
ascertained Plemons' address such as calling her phone number in the local
directory, requesting the assistance of her tenants, or asking her mortgagee for her
address. Id. The lower court concluded that, because none of these actions were
taken, Plemons did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of her right of
redemption, and the lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Plemons.
Id. The lienholders appealed. Id.
152. Plemons, 396 F.3d at 573.
153. Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
154. Id. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
155. Plemons, 396 F.3d at 573. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317-18.
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calculated under all the circumstances to apprise' a
party 'of the pendency' of the deprivation of
property. 1
56
Further, notice that is known by the party required to give notice
to have failed does not satisfy constitutional requirements. 157 And
while the particularities of each case are to be considered, "actual
notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding
which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any
party... if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable."' 158
The Fourth Circuit continued on to interpret Mullane as requiring
that further action be taken where mailed notice is promptly
returned. 59 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit decided that, upon return
of the mailed notices, the lienholder should have searched all public
county records, and since it was unclear from the record whether the
lienholder did so, or whether such efforts would have been fruitful,
the Fourth Circuit remanded. 160
In sum, Plemons interpreted due process requirements to contain
a duty to take further action when a notice of tax sale is returned
undelivered. Further, this case advocated a case-by-case
consideration and not only required a determination of whether
further action was taken to provide notice, but it also indicated that a
decision in a case such as this should depend, at least somewhat, on
whether or not the further action prescribed would have been
successful, i.e. whether a search of the public records would have
unearthed Plemons' true address.
156. Plemons, 396 F.3d at 573 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315); (quoting
Dusenberry, 534 U.S. at 168-171) (internal citations omitted).
157. Id. See Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40.
158. Plemons, 396 F.3d at 573 (quoting Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., 485
U.S. at 489, 485) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
159. Id. at 575 ("Adopting the rule that prompt return of mailed notice triggers
a duty to make reasonable follow-up efforts would seem to best comport with the
instruction in Mullane that due process requires efforts 'reasonably calculated' to
actually 'apprise interested parties' of the possible deprivation; that is, notice
consistent with that of 'one desirous of actually informing the absentee,' rather than
efforts that are but a 'mere gesture."') (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15).
160. Id. at 577.
B. Statutory Background
The statute at issue here is Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated §
26-35-705. It states: "...the sheriff or collector shall be required to
mail statements of taxes due by any taxpayer to the address provided
by the taxpayer. In the event that the address of the taxpayer
changes, the taxpayer has an obligation to furnish the correct
address."' 61 Thus, the statute requires only notice by mail to the
address provided by the property owner.
III. FACTS
In 1967, Gary Jones (hereinafter "Jones") bought a home at 717
North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas.' 62  Jones paid the
monthly mortgage every month for thirty years, and then the
mortgage company paid the property taxes for the home. 63 In 1993,
Jones separated from his wife, and he moved to a Little Rock
apartment while his wife continued to live at the North Bryan Street
home.' 64 Unfortunately for Jones, when he paid off his mortgage in
1997, the mortgage company stopped paying the property taxes, so
they went unpaid. 65 Soon thereafter, the property was certified as
delinquent. 166
In April of 2000, the Commissioner of State Lands (hereinafter
"Commissioner") mailed a certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan
Street address in an attempt to notify Jones of the delinquent status of
the property and Jones' right to redeem the property. 167  The
information in the certified letter informed Jones that if he did not
redeem the property, it would be subject to public sale in two
years. 68 When the letter was delivered to the North Bryan Street
address, no one was home to sign for it, and no one retrieved the
161. Ark. Code. Ann. § 26-35-705 (1987).






168. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1712.
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letter within the next fifteen days, so the letter was returned to the
Commissioner as "unclaimed."' 169
After a period of two years had elapsed, the Commissioner
published a notice of public sale in the Arkansas Democratic Gazette
just a few weeks before the public sale. 170 Because no bids were
submitted for the property, the State negotiated a private sale of the
property to respondent, Linda Flowers (hereinafter "Flowers").'17
However, before completing the sale, the Commissioner mailed a
second certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street address so as
to notify him that, if he did not pay his taxes, his property would be
sold. 172 The second letter was returned in the same way the first one
was, marked as "unclaimed."' 73
As a result, the State sold the house, which had a fair market
value of $80,000, for a final sale price of $21,042.15.174 The thirty-
day period for post-sale redemption passed, and Flowers sent an
unlawful detainer notice to the North Bryan Street property.175 That
notice was served on Jones' daughter who advised her father of the
tax sale of the property.' 76
Upon finding out about the sale of the North Bryan Street
property, Jones filed suit in Arkansas state court against both the
Commissioner and Flowers and alleged that the failure of the
169. Id. Even if Jones' wife had been home to witness the delivery of the
certified letter, she would not have been able to claim it or otherwise determine its




173. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1718.
174. Id. at 1713. This sale left Jones, an employee of the United States Social
Security Administration, short some $65,000 in equity. Id. Ashlea Ebeling,
Surprise! We sold your house,
http ://www.forbes.com/services/2006/04/10/supreme-court-foreclosure-
cz ae_041 1beltway.html.
175. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1713.
176. Id. The unlawful detainer notice was likely served personally on Jones'
daughter, so the inhabitants of the North Bryan Street property had no indication
that the property had been sold under receiving notice that they were being ejected
from the property. Id.
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Commissioner to provide notice of the tax sale and of the Jones'
rights constituted a taking of his property without due process.' 7 7
The Commissioner and Flowers filed for summary judgment
alleging that the two certified letters sent by the Commissioner
satisfied the Constitutional requirements for notice. 178 Jones filed a
cross-suit for summary judgment, but the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Commissioner and Flowers on the basis that
the Arkansas tax sale statute, requiring notice of the type provided by
the Commissioner, satisfied constitutional due process
requirements. 179
Jones appealed the trial court's ruling, and the Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed, noting Supreme Court precedent holding that due
process does not require actual notice and holding that attempts to
provide notice via certified mail satisfied due process.18 ° The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 181
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion in which
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice
Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Scalia and
Kennedy joined. Justice Alito did not participate in the decision of
this case.1 82
The issue before the Court here was whether the government is
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
take "additional reasonable steps" to provide notice of a tax sale to a
property owner where prior attempts at notice by mail were returned
undelivered. 183





182. Id. at 1711.
183. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1712.
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A. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts began the opinion by affirming the basic
principle that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prevents a state from taking property and selling it without providing
the owner of the property with notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 184
However, a government need not provide actual notice to a
property owner before taking a delinquent property.1 85 Instead, due
process requires the government to provide "notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections."'' 86
In this case, the Commissioner argued that mailing the
certified letters to Jones conformed to the requirements of the Due
Process Clause because that action was reasonably calculated to
provide notice. 187  Further, the Commissioner contended that a
property owner is responsible for maintaining a current address on
record, and the Arkansas statute was reasonably calculated to provide
notice since it requires that notice be mailed via certified mail to an
address for which the owner is responsible. 188 In fact, according to
the Commissioner, the Arkansas statutory scheme requires the use of
certified mail when provided notice of a tax sale, so it actually
provides protection for property owners beyond what the Due
Process Clause requires. 189
In support of the State's position, the Commissioner pointed out
that the Supreme Court has heard many cases in which the Court
deemed notice by mail sufficient to satisfy due process
considerations.' 90
184. Id. at 1712.
185. Id. at 1713. See Dusenberry, 534 U.S. at 170.
186. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1713-14 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
187. Id. at 1713-14.
188. Id. at 1714. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-35-705 (1997).
189. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1714.
190. Id. See e.g., Dusenberry, 534 U.S. at 169; Tulsa Prof I Collection Servs.,
Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988); Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798; Mullane, 339
U.S. at 318-19.
While the Supreme Court agreed with the Commissioner's
position that notice is constitutionally sufficient if it is reasonably
calculated to reach its intended recipient, this situation is different
from the situations in Dusenberry and Mullane because, unlike here,
the government in Dusenberry and Mullane had no reason to believe
that attempts to provide notice had been unsuccessful.'91
The issue here is a distinct and novel issue before the Court
because the State received the returned notice which the postal
service had marked "unclaimed," so the State knew that its attempts
to provide Jones with notice had failed. 92  And as the Court
previously stated, "notice required will vary with circumstances and
conditions."' 193  Thus, the question in this case is whether the
government's knowledge that the notice did not reach its intended
recipient is a "circumstance and condition" that triggers a
responsibility to provide a different type of notice.'1 94
The Court goes on to say that the decision in Mullane required
the use of a balancing test when determining whether a State
provided sufficient notice in a certain situation. 95 The balancing test
arising under Mullane involves balancing the State's interests versus
the interest of the individual.196 Ultimately, when a property owner
is entitled to due process "[t]he means employed must be such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to
accomplish it ... " 197
Here, the Court stated that if the Commissioner really wanted to
inform Jones of the impending tax sale of his home, the
Commissioner would have taken further action when the letter was
returned unclaimed. 198 By way of analogy, Chief Justice Roberts
imagined a scenario in which the Commissioner watches as the
191. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1714.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Walker, 352 U.S. at 115).
194. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1714.
195. Id. at 1715.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1715 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
198. Id. at 1716.
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postman accidentally drops notices being mailed to delinquent
taxpayers into the storm drain and then shrugs and says "I tried". 199
In that situation, as in this one, the Commissioner knew that the
letter had not reached its intended recipient, so the Commissioner's
failure to follow up was "unreasonable, despite the fact that the
letters were reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients
when delivered to the postman." 200 Additionally, although the State
may have made a reasonable calculation of how to reach Jones, it had
good reason to suspect, when the notice was returned, that Jones was
"no better off than if the notice had never been sent." 21 Thus, if the
Commissioner had been "desirous of actually informing" Jones of the
tax sale of his home, the Commissioner would have taken further
steps to notify Jones of the sale.202
The Court further stated that its prior cases have required the
government to consider "unique information" about the intended
recipient of a communication even where the statutory actions were
reasonably calculated to provide notice.20 3 For instance, in Robinson
v. Hanrahan, the Court held that, when the State had knowledge that
the owner of a vehicle was in prison, notice of forfeiture proceedings
sent to the owner's home address did not suffice. 20 4
Similarly, in Covey v. Town of Somers, notification of a
foreclosure by mailing, positing, and publication did not suffice when
the property owner was known by the state to be incompetent and
without the protection of a guardian. 20 5 In Covey and Robinson, the
knowledge of the government that a particular means of providing
notice was ineffective triggered an obligation to take further steps to
provide notice. 20 6 In the same way, the Commissioner's knowledge
that the notice had not reached its intended recipient triggered an
obligation to take further steps to provide notice.20 7
199. Id.
200. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1716.
201. Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. See Robinson, 409 U.S. at 40.
205. Id. See Covey, 351 U.S. at 141.
206. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1716.
207. Id.
The State was also not relieved of its duty to take further action
simply because Jones had a legal obligation under the Arkansas
statute to update his address on record.2 ° 8  In Robinson, the
determinative factor was not that the vehicle owner had not complied
with his statutory obligations to maintain an updated record, but
rather the fact that the state knew that the property owner would not
be notified by its efforts.20 9  Thus, while the Arkansas statute
requiring a property owner to maintain an updated address on file
with the state provides support for the idea that the notice sent by the
Commissioner was reasonably calculated to inform Jones, it does
nothing to mitigate the fact that the Commissioner took no further
action once it had knowledge of the failure of the means of providing
notice. 210
The Court also disagreed with the Commissioner's arguments
that, "after failing to receive a property tax bill and after failing to
pay property taxes, a property holder is on inquiry-notice that his
property is subject to governmental taking," and that Jones should
have left his property in the hands of persons who would have
notified him if it were in jeopardy. 211 The fact that a property owner
should know that there will be adverse consequences if he does not
pay his property taxes does not excuse the state from its
constitutional obligation to provide notice before taking private
property.2 12  In fact, the Court specifically refuted that idea in
Mennonite, stating that "knowledge of delinquency in the payment of
taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending. '"213
Further, Arkansas gives a delinquent taxpayer an opportunity to
rectify the situation and redeem his property, so failure to pay taxes
in itself provides no notice of tax sale.214
In terms of Jones' obligation to leave his property in the hands of
those who would notify him if his property interest was in jeopardy,




211. Id. at 1717.
212. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1717.
213. Id. (quoting Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800).
214. Id.
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such as "libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel[,] or entry upon real
estate in the name of law. . ." are the seizures that "may reasonably
be expected to come promptly to the owner's attention." 2
15
However, Chief Justice Roberts stated that an occupant of
property is not necessarily acting as an agent for the owner, and "it is
quite a leap from Justice Jackson's examples to conclude that it is an
obligation of tenancy to follow up with certified mail of unknown
content addressed to the owner., 216  Also, the State procedure
prevents the occupants of a home from knowing what the certified
communication was about since it would have required Jones'
signature in order to be claimed.2 17 Also, the Court points out that
there is no evidential record of notices of attempted delivery left at
the North Bryan Street address.218
In Covey and Robinson, the notice provided was deemed
constitutionally insufficient because the State was aware of the
circumstances making the notice insufficient. 219 However, here the
State was not aware of the circumstances surrounding Jones' absence
from the property before sending notice. 220 The Court disposed of
this distinction by reaffirming the principle that "the constitutionality
of a particular procedure for notice is assessed ex ante, rather than
post hoc," and a certain procedure may be generally adequate but fail
in a specific situation. 221
Ultimately, the Court decided that the State should have taken
additional reasonable steps to notify Jones under the
circumstances. 222  The notice the Commissioner published in the
newspaper a few weeks before the sale of the property did not
constitute sufficient additional reasonable steps since "'[c]hance
alone' brings a person's attention to 'an advertisement in small type
inserted in the back pages of a newspaper.' 223
215. Id. at 1718 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1718.
219. Id. at 1716.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1717; See also Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REv. 233, 235 (2006).
222. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1717.
223. Id. at 1720 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S.at 315).
Chief Justice Roberts then identified some additional reasonable
steps the State could have taken so as to improve the notice such as
resending the notice by regular mail, so that a signature would not be
required to claim the notice.224 Also, an occupant finding a letter sent
by regular mail might be more likely to write the owner's new
address on it or notify the owner directly. 225
Another possible means of notice would have been to post notice
on the front door of the house, or to address the notice to "occupant"
so that someone would be sure to open it.226 These measures would
have been more likely to provide notice to Jones, and in fact, Jones
learned of the action against his property when an occupant of his
home, his daughter, was served with the unlawful detainer notice.227
Thus, because it was "possible and practicable" to provide more
effective notice of the tax sale to Jones, the notice by publication
does not render the Commissioner's actions constitutionally
adequate.228 From a policy standpoint, the Court states that, in
effecting a tax sale, "the State is exerting extraordinary power against
a property owner-taking and selling a house he owns." 229 As such,
"[i]t is not too much to insist that the State do a bit more to attempt to
let him know about it when the notice letter addressed to him is
returned unclaimed., 23
0
B. Justice Thomas' Dissent
Justice Thomas wrote the dissenting opinion in this case, and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined. The dissenting Justices
224. Id. at 1719. The Court further stated that certified mail might actually
make notice less likely to occur since a letter sent via certified mail cannot be left




227. Id. Chief Justice Roberts stated that the State need not go so far as to
search for an interested party's address in the phonebook or other government
records. Such an unlimited search for an interested party's address imposes too
great a burden on the State. Id.
228. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1719.
229. Id. at 1721.
230. Id.
Sp~ring 2007 Practicalities and Peculiarities
242 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-1
considered the methods of providing notice employed by the State of
Arkansas to be reasonably calculated to inform and, as such, valid
under the Due Process Clause.
231
Justice Thomas points out that the Supreme Court has, in many
cases, recognized notice mailed to an interested party's last known
address as satisfying the Due Process Clause.232 Also, the dissent
saw an especially strong basis for the State's action since the notice
was sent to the address provided by Jones himself.233 Justice Thomas
states, "[m]y conclusion that Arkansas' notice methods satisfy due
process is reinforced by the well-established presumption that
individuals, especially those owning property, act in their own
interest." 234  As such, the State was "free to 'indulge in the
assumption"' that Jones would have provided his current address in
the public record or that he had someone at the property who would
make him aware of any threat against his property.235 Thus, Justice
Thomas views the crucial question not to be whether the occupants of
the property were acting in Jones' interests, but whether Jones was
acting in his own interests. 6
Further, the dissenting Justices identified several reasons for
which they disagreed with the idea that the government's knowledge
that notice had been ineffectual triggered a further obligation.23 7
First, the dissent examined the reasonableness of notice from the
perspective of the State at the time the notice was sent, or ex ante.238
The dissent based this conclusion on the decision in Mullane where
the analysis considered information available to the sender at the time
the notice was sent. 239 Also, in Dusenberry, the Court refused to
determine reasonableness of notice based on information discovered
post hoc.240
231. Id. at 1722 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1723 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See Dusenberry, 534 U.S. at 169;
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318; Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798.






239. Id.; See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318.
240. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1723. See also Dusenberry, 534 U.S. at 171-72.
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Justice Thomas and the dissenting Justices consider the
Majority's opinion to be an abandonment of those principles since
the proposed improved methods of providing notice are post hoc
considerations. 2
4 1
Second, the dissent views the attack on the State's notice methods
as a departure from the Dusenberry principle that actual notice need
not be achieved. 42 Because the Majority's rationale requires the
State to continually consider additional means that would more likely
achieve notice, and since there is no limit to the improvements on
notice, the dissent sees this as effectively requiring actual notice
contrary to Dusenberry and Mullane.243
Further, "[t]he only circumstances in which this Court has found
notice by mail and publication inadequate under the Due Process
Clause involve situations where the state or local government knew
at the outset that its notice efforts were destined to fail ....
Justice Thomas points out that the State did not know its notice
would fail at the time the notice was sent, and the fact that the notice
sent via certified mail was returned "unclaimed" does not necessarily
mean that an address is outdated.245 As such, "[t]he State cannot be
charged to correct a problem of petitioner's own creation and of
which it was not aware." 246
The dissent focuses on the fact that, while notice must be
reasonably calculated so as to be effective, "'[h]eroic efforts,'
however, are not required., 247  According to Justice Thomas, the
Court has previously rejected an interpretation of the Due Process
Clause which would "place impossible or impractical obstacles in the
way [of the State]. 248 Further, prior cases have not required actual
notice and have found constitutional validity where the means for
241. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1724.
242. Id.; See Dusenberry, at 169-70.
243. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1724.
244. Id. See Robinson, 408 U.S. at 39 (per curiam) (intended recipient known
to be in jail); Covey, 351 U.S. at 145 (intended recipient known to be incompetent
and without a guardian).
245. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1725.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1722 (quoting Dusenberry, 534 U.S. at 170).
248. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1722 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14).
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notification were "reasonably certain" to provide notice.249 Justice
Thomas even goes so far as to advocate the use of notice by
publication, saying that such notice is valid under Mullane where the
address of the interested party is unknown.
250
Based on this standard, the dissent finds the means employed by
Arkansas to be constitutionally adequate. 25' Specifically, the dissent
found the Commissioner's sending a letter via certified mail to Jones'
address of record to be adequate. 252 Further, the dissent fears that the
majority's new requirements for notice will be burdensome for the
State, forcing the State to locate thousands of delinquent property
owners each year. 253  In conclusion, Justice Thomas states, "The
Court's decision today forecloses such a reasonable system and




This case acknowledges that whether notification satisfies due
process in a given instance depends on the "circumstances and
conditions" surrounding the notice. As such, for the property
purchaser, it remains difficult to determine whether one will be
purchasing clear title to property if the interested parties have not yet
been located.255
A. Legislative Impact
The impact of this decision on the laws formulated by the
legislature will likely be minimal. Any heightened duty to consider
information gained after sending notice but before taking the
249. Id. (quoting Dusenberry, 534 U.S. at 169-70).
250. Id. at 1725. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 316 ("[P]ublication traditionally
has been acceptable as notification supplemental to other action which in itself may
reasonably be expected to convey a warning").
251. Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1725.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1725. Justice Thomas pointed out that 18,000 properties are
certified delinquent on an annual basis. Id.
254. Id.
255. Lorin Hirrano, In Non-Judical Tax Sales, Hi. B.J., August, 2006.
property, such as failure of delivery of notice sent via certified mail,
is limited by the principle espoused in Jones v. Flower, that sending
notice by regular mail is constitutionally appropriate.25 6 Thus, this
decision will only impact legislatures to the extent that they may
need to update their statutes regarding notice of actions against real
property to provide for further action in the form of a letter sent by
regular mail and addressed to "Occupant" where notice sent via
certified mail is returned "undelivered."
B. Judicial Impact
Because of the 'nebulous formulations' regarding what types of
notice satisfy constitutional requirements, the Justices in both the
majority and the dissent justified their positions based on the same
due process principles that have historically been applied, and the
vagueness of those principles allowed them to use the same precedent
and rationales to come to opposite conclusions. 7
The Supreme Court, in deciding when constitutional
protections apply in non-criminal, adjudicative
contexts, has generally failed to specify and articulate
the values which underlie due process. Moreover, in
those cases in which the Court has attempted to define
due process values, it has generally done so in an
ambiguous and unsatisfactory fashion. 8
Both the majority and the dissent agreed on the Mullane principle
that "[t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."259
256. Flowers, 126 S.Ct. at 1720; The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading
Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at 241. The idea that notice sent by regular mail is
constitutionally sufficient is not a new one. See Dusenberry, 534 U.S. at 172-73;
Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. 485 U.S. at 490; Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799,
800 (1983); Greene, 456 U.S. at 455; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
257. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases 120 HARV. L. REV. at
233.
258. Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113
(1978).
259. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. at 1714 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314); Id. at
1722 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting the same text); The Supreme Court, 2005
Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L REV. 233, 237 (2006).
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Also, the eight participating Justices were in agreement that "the
constitutionality of a particular procedure for notice is assessed ex
ante, rather than post hoc."
260
However, the lack of guidance provided by the principles enable
the opinions to diverge while remaining grounded in decisions
considered to be standing precedent. 26' One shortcoming with the
Mullane standard is that it neglects to consider the balancing of
government interests versus individual interests. 262 The standard is
equally applicable to extremely valuable property and property that is
less so. 26
3
The only way around this conclusion is to pack the
balancing into the word 'reasonably,' but Mullane
and other Court precedents seem to imply that
Mullane reasonableness concerns only the accuracy
of the chosen method relative to other normal or
customary methods. The language of the Mullane test
thus appears irredeemably antagonistic towards
balancing. 264
260. Flowers, 126 S.Ct. at 1717 (majority opinion); see Id. at 1723 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) ("[w]hether a method of notice is reasonably calculated to notify the
interested party is determined ex ante . . ."); The Supreme Court, 2005 Term -
Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at 237.
261. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at
237.
262. Id. at 237. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (due
process requires a balancing of the private interest, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of that interest, and the value of added procedural protections against
the interest of the government); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646
(2004) (plurality opinion) (balancing needed in order to resolve the strain between
the autonomy needed by the government in order for it to accomplish some goal
and the process due to a citizen before being deprive of his or her right);
263. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at
237.
264. Id. at 238; See Greene, 456 U.S. at 454 ("[t[he reasonableness of the
notice provided must be tested with reference to the existence of 'feasible and
customary' alternatives and supplements to the form of notice chosen."); Mullane,
339 U.S. at 315 ("[t]he reasonableness.. .of any chosen method may be defended
on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, or,
where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not
substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and
customary substitutes." (internal citations omitted)). However, it could be that the
Mullane test, by its design, provides a balancing test. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314
However, while the Supreme Court formally espoused Mullane, it
has not completely discounted the consideration of the property
involved and the balancing of interests.265 For instance, in Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, the Court engaged in a
balancing inquiry. Other cases such as Mennonite and Walker v. City
of Hutchinson moved slightly closer to a balancing test.266
In this case, the Court brought the prior, hidden balancing test to
the forefront by creating a two-tiered analysis based on the Mullane
test as well as a balancing test.267 In fact, the Court took its role quite
somberly in this case since the decision concerned the possible loss
of a large individual asset, a home. 268 Thus, this case brought the
balancing test into a predominant role in the due process analysis
alongside the revered Mullane test.
269
("Against this interest of the State we must balance the individual interest sought to
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."). However, this still would not take
into account the value of the property interest or the situational difficulties a sender
might encounter in providing notice. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading
Cases, 120 HARv. L. REV. at 239 n.55. On the other hand, it could be that
balancing is an improper approach to due process questions because of the
"enormous administra[tive] problems [it poses] related to imcommensurability and
imprecision." Id.
265. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at
238.
266. Id. at 239 n.52. See Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc., 485 U.S. at 484,
489-90; Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 798 ("[t]o begin with, a mortgagee possesses a
substantial property interest that is significantly affected by a tax sale."); Walker,
352 U.S. at 115 ("[w]e [in Mullane] called attention to the impossibility of setting
up a rigid formula as to the kind of notice that must be given; notice required will
vary with circumstances and conditions."); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965-66 (1987) ("[t]he rise of
balancing here is closely linked with the recognition of new forms of property
protected by the due process clause. The importance of 'entitlements' such as
welfare benefits . . . seemed to demand procedural protections against their
deprivation, but the ever-increasing size of the welfare state made imposition of
procedures a costly enterprise. Balancing provided a flexible strategy that took
account of both interests.").
267. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at
239. See Flowers, 126 S. Ct. at 1715.
268. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at
239; Flowers, 126 S. Ct. at 1716 (the case involved "such an important and
irreversible prospect as the loss of a house.").
269. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at
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The second fault of the Mullane test is that it fails to take into
account the differences between an individual seeking to inform
another of some important information and the government doing the
same.270  While the government seeks efficiency and standardized
procedures in its operations over the ad hoc decisionmaking system
utilized by individuals, government may avail itself of greater
resources and alternate types of notice more easily than an individual
may.271 "Because of this incongruence between doctrine and reality,
it seems unlikely that the Mullane test is significant beyond its
rhetorical force."
272
Another challenge in terms of application of this case to future
cases is that the ex ante principle is malleable depending on how the
government procedure is defined.273 For instance, the dissent argued
that the ex ante principle would be violated by any requirement
regarding events following the sending of notice by certified mail,
since the procedure to be considered is sending notice by certified
mail.274 Alternatively, the majority viewed the sending of certified
mail and the formation of a plan of action should the mail be returned
unclaimed as the relevant procedure. 27 5  Thus, both procedures
satisfy the ex ante principle, as could any procedure adequately
defined. 6 This weak formula is likely to cause confusion for lower
courts.
277
270. Id. at 239-40.
271. Id. at 240.
272. Id. However, Mullane is considered the predominant test for issues of
due process. In Dusenberry, the Court stated that "Although we have invoked
Mathews to evaluate due process claims in other contexts, we have never viewed
Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims.
Since Mullane was decided, we have regularly tumed to it when confronted with
questions regarding the adequacy of the method used to give notice." Dusenberry,
534 U.S. at 167-68.




276. Id ("for example: certified mail is to be sent and if after the tax sale the
taxpayer testifies under oath that he did not receive notice, the tax sale shall be
voided.").
277. Id.
Perhaps more intriguing than the decision of the Court is the
insight it gives into Chief Justice Roberts' Court.278 This decision
marked a split in the conservative Justices, with Chief Justice Roberts
distancing himself from conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas and
agreeing with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.279
The conservative Justices may have split because the
question could not be resolved clearly by reference to
the original understanding, or because the question of
what notice is required is so unclear, given the
multiple forms of mail available today, that the
original understanding has little value. Without that
common point of reference, the conservatives may
have revealed a divergence in their approaches: while
Justices Scalia and Thomas may be inclined to err on
the side of judicial restraint, declining to extend the
reach of constitutional rights beyond what precedent
mandates, Chief Justice Roberts may be inclined to
give priority to another favorite conservative cause-
private property rights. The extent of this potential
methodological split remains to be seen.280
278. Id. at 242.
279. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at
242; See Hadley Arkes, Playing Well with Others?, National Review Online, May
18, 2006, available at
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NmUyMGQOMDJIMWM3YjdkNDYzZmRk
NjZkMTYzMWRNjE=; Ashlea Ebeling, Justice Roberts Slams State's Property
Seizure, Forbes.com, Apr. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.forbes.com/businessinthebeltway/2006/04/2 7/supreme-court-property-
foreclosure-cz ae 0427scotus.html; Posting of D. Benjamin Barros to PropertyProf
Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2006/04/jones-v-flowers, Apr.
26, 2006.
280. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. at
242-43; See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2009 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[a]s a general matter we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to
constitutional rules that bring us into constant conflict with a coequal branch of
Government."); See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671
(2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and
Thomas, JJ.). Dusenberry v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002), was the last due
process notice case considered by the Supreme Court, and the decision favored the
government, splitting 5-4 along the traditional liberal-conservative lines. However,
Barros points out that Dusenberry was a case involving a prisoner, and "[Barros
has] a personal view that it is a mistake to try to draw conclusions from prisoner
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Chief Justice Roberts may have been reacting to the uproar over
the prior decision of Kelo v. City of New London, or he may have
simply believed that the state would have taken further action if it
really wanted to notify Jones of the sale of his property, but whatever
the reasons may be, this case signals a protection by the more liberal
Justices and Chief Justice Roberts of the modest homes of those who
may not be particularly wealthy or knowledgeable in matters of
property. 281 After all, as Chief Justice Roberts said, "[t]here is no
reason to suppose that the State will ever be less than fully zealous in
its efforts to secure its tax revenue needs. The same cannot be said
for the State's efforts to ensure that its citizens receive proper notice
before the State takes action against them." 28
2
cases and apply them to other contexts." Posting of D. Benjamin Barros to
PropertyProf Blog, available at
http://awprofessors.typepad.com/property/2006/04/jones-v-flowers (Apr. 26,
2006).
281. Hadley Arkes, Playing Well with Others?, National Review Online, May
18, 2006, available at
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q-NmUyMGQOMDJIMWM3YjdkNDYzZmRk
NjZkMTYzMWR1NjE. Also, Professor Ben Barros points out that the liberals and
conservatives took opposite sides on the question of due process protections for a
property owner's right to maintain ownership of a home in Jones v. Flowers and
Kelo. Although the constitutional questions were unique in each case, the fact
remains that Justices who had favored property owners' rights in takings cases
(Kelo) took a hard line against requiring the government to take additional, modest
steps to notify a property owner of a tax sale (Flowers). Posting of D. Benjamin
Barros to PropertyProf Blog, available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2006/04/jones-v-flowers (Apr. 26,
2006).
282. Ashlea Ebeling, Justice Roberts Slams State's Property Seizure,
Forbes.com, Apr. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.forbes.com/businessinthebeltway/2006/04/2 7/supreme-court-property-
foreclosure-cz ae_0427scotus.html. Although, Ben Barros questions the financial
rationality of governments and expresses his surprise with the State's position in
Jones v. Flower since, "[t]ax forfeitures require a lot more effort than taking a few
relatively minor steps to provide actual notice to the property owner. In part for
this reason, many states require additional efforts to provide notice." Posting of D.




This decision allows state governments to avoid the additional
duties that arise when notice is sent by certified mail, such as
realizing that the notice was not received when it is returned
"unclaimed," by simply sending notice via regular mail, which the
Court described as "an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is
reasonably calculated to provide actual notice. 283 However, Justice
Thomas opined that regular mail "is arguably less effective than
certified mail," so the use of regular mail might actually reduce
procedural protections under the Due Process Clause.284
While it seems at face value that Jones v. Flowers represents an
expansion of due process protections for property, the case does not
necessarily require any greater protections than those which are
already in place in many states. 285  In fact "many States already
require in their statutes that the government do more than simply
mail notice to delinquent owners either at the outset or as a followup
measure if initial mailed notice is ineffective." 286
The impact of the decision of the Majority here is that a State is
now required to take reasonable additional steps to provide notice in
order to satisfy the Due Process Clause when the state becomes
aware that the notice it has attempted did not serve its purpose. Thus,
this case heightens the standard for constitutional notification and
makes it more likely that property owners will receive actual notice
of actions taken by the State in relation to their property. This case
283. Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs.,485 U.S. at 490; 120 HARV. L. REv at 241.
284. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. at 1726 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 120 HARV. L. REv.
at 241.
285. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REv. at
233.
[W]hile advocates of greater procedural due process protections
ostensibly won a victory, it was a small one at best, and possibly
a step backward. Most states already meet the standard the Court
formulated in Flowers, and those that do not may have an
incentive to cut back their notice procedures rather than expand
them.
286. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. at 1715; Id. at 1715 n.2 (listing states that already use
procedures consistent with the decision in Flowers); The Supreme Court, 2005
Term - Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REv. at 242 n.68 (listing states not included
in the Flowers opinion that already use procedures consistent with Flowers).
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also seriously undermines any contention that notice by publication
will serve in any capacity to defend a State's actions as satisfying the
Due Process Clause.
However, as the dissent pointed out, this decision places on the
states the burden of increasing their efforts to notify delinquent
property owners. A state's system of requiring property owners to
maintain current address information combined with authorization to
send property notices to addresses of record via certified mail is no
longer a viable system.
At the same time, the cost to a state will likely not be greatly
increased as a result of this decision since the majority specifically
stated that one way to remedy this problem would be to post notice
and send notice via regular mail. These measures are not extreme, as
regular mail is actually less expensive than certified mail. Thus, for a
slight change in state procedure, and possibly a small added cost,
property owners gain greater chances for notification and a decreased
risk that their property will be sold by tax sale without their
knowledge.
Actions beyond mailing notice, such as searching for a property
owner's address in the phonebook or public records, are not required
by this decision.287
VI. CONCLUSION
While upholding its prior principals that actual notice is not
necessary, the Court reaffirmed the idea that notice must be
reasonably calculated to inform the property owner of actions against
his or her property, and held that a state must take further actions to
provide notice where the state has received communications
indicating that its notice attempts were unsuccessful. Such
reasonable steps may take the form of posted notice or notice sent by
regular mail.288 Ultimately, this case represents an attempt by the
287. Ashlea Ebeling, Justice Roberts Slams State's Property Seizure,
Forbes.com, Apr. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.forbes.com/businessinthebeltway/2006/04/27/supreme-court-property-
foreclosure-cz ae_0427scotus.html.
288. As a result of this decision, the case will be remanded to trial court, and
Flowers will be reimbursed for the purchase price of the house. She will no longer
have an interest in the property, and Jones will have the opportunity to clear the
Supreme Court to heighten due process protections. However, since
many state statutes already comply with the holding in Jones v.
Flower, the practical impact of this decision remains to be seen.
At the very least, this decision will allow property owners to rest
assured that, in the event an action is taken against their property
while they are on vacation, or at their principal residence, or ill, they
will have a letter providing notice of the action waiting for them upon
their return.
title to his house by paying the back taxes owed to the state. Id. Also, the State of
Arkansas changed its notification procedures after litigation in this case had begun,
but it is unknown whether the statutory change was a result of this case. Posting of
D. Benjamin Barros to PropertyProf Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2006/04/jones-v flowers (Apr. 26,
2006).
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